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This paper aims to analyze how governments of the modern era can better engage with 
contemporary terrorist organizations. It argues that nations and governments must alter their 
strategy on terrorism in light of its increasing prevalence and lethality in the modern era. 
Proclamations of non-negotiation, made with false perceptions that terrorists are simply irrational 
radical actors, are no longer viable if governments truly seek to reduce terrorist violence. In fact, 
it’s the ambiguity of terrorism and the major differentiation in the practices of various 
organizations which necessitate a more flexible strategy. Simply, the one-size-fits all solution of 
unequivocal no-negotiation is unable to contend with terrorism of the modern era. Additionally, 
these proclamations may actually lead to a higher rate of violence. As shown by game theory, the 
bargaining model, and various studies measuring deterrence value and terrorist responses to 
changing situations, it is evident that modern governments must revamp their counterterrorism 
policy to involve increased flexibility and emphasis on negotiation. 
This paper used both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources involved four 
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Research Questions and Framework 
 
According to the Global Terrorism Database, both the prevalence and lethality of terrorist 
attacks in the modern world are rapidly trending upwards (Global Terrorism Database). With 
over 8,500 attacks in 2012, quadruple the amount of attacks as in 2000 (Global Terrorism 
Database), “the current decade features a higher frequency and lethality of terrorist attacks than 
any prior decade since 1970” (Chenoweth & Moore, 7). Terrorism, however, is no modern 
phenomena. Evidence links the concept as far back as the Roman Empire, when Jewish Zealots 
would inspire fear upon onlookers through killing Romans in public (Chenoweth & Moore, 13). 
The word terrorism, however, is a much more recent conception. Popularized during the Reign 
of Terror in the French Revolution, terrorism was seen as a violent yet necessary means to a 
desired political end (Chenoweth & Moore, 14). Contemporary terrorism, though, is much 
different than that of terrorism during the Roman Empire and French Revolution. According to 
political scientist Bruce Hoffman, contemporary terrorism finds its origin in the “ethno-
nationalist insurrections that followed the Second World War” (Hoffman 19). These acts, 
perpetrated by groups such as the Irgun, FLN, and the EOKA, laid the foundation for the 
“transformation of terrorism in the late 1960s from a primarily localized phenomenon into a 
security problem of global proportions” (Hoffman 20).  
Contemporary terrorism is different from the terrorism of the past – Modern technology 
has given those who practice it greater reach and greater effectiveness. Sometimes called “new 
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terrorism,” contemporary terrorism is categorized by its ability to “extend beyond national 
borders,” its greater access to “technologies that make highly lethal terrorists acts easier to 
commit,” and its often “intensely religious” attributes (Hoffman 14, Chenoweth & Moore 18). 
Authors of The Politics of Terror Erica Chenoweth and Pauline Moore suggest that, as 
consequence of its ever increasing lethality and frequency, terrorism is becoming more of a 
“global strategic reality in current times.” It is important to note that these transitions are 
impossible pinpoint on a calendar or specific event. Rather, the evolution of terrorism is nearly 
as ambiguous as its definition itself. It is “constantly changing and evolving” with that of 
technology, politics, and society (Hoffman). 
Certainly a controversial concept, the definition of terrorism has been argued and debated 
by scholars and political scientists throughout history. Some, like political scientist and national 
security expert Grant Wardlaw, even consider the “definitional quest” as the “Holy Grail” of 
terrorism studies (Wardlaw). As Chenoweth and Moore write, debating the definition of 
terrorism is in and of itself a political act. And, as is so often heard: one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom fighter. Different political entities, including the closest of allies and the most 
bitter of rivals, disagree highly in their determinations of whether specific groups are or are not 
terroristic in nature. For example, Journalist and specialist in European and US relations Gerald 
Olivier points out that the European Union and the United States, despite their alliance in the war 
against terror, have drastically different designations of which groups are actually classified as 
terror organizations (Olivier). The differences, he argues, often reflect regional concerns, citing 
the example of the Irish Republican Army. Despite the close ties between the United States and 
the United Kingdom, the Irish Republican Army was never classified as a terrorist group by 
official US lists (although the United States did eventually add the Real Irish Republican Army, 
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a splinter group of the former IRA, to the list in 2001) (Olivier).  On the reverse, the United 
States has delegated several militant Marxist organizations in South America, such as the Manuel 
Rodríguez Patriotic Front and Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, as terroristic, whereas the 
UK and EU have not (Beck & Miner).  
Despite the many perspectives, however, the field of international politics is incomplete 
without the presence of the contested term. This is because terrorism is increasingly real, 
increasingly prevalent, and increasingly disruptive (Chenoweth & Moore, 7). “As terrorist 
groups increase their capacity, participation, and control over territory or ideological space, they 
can become much more stable fixtures in the political life” (Chenoweth & Moore 10). Perhaps 
even more importantly, terrorism is extremely important to the public. In a 2007 Pew Research 
Poll conducted in 47 countries around the world, an average of 41% of respondents reported that 
terrorism was a “very big problem” (Pew Global Attitudes & Trends, A Rising Tide Lifts Mood 
in the Developing World, 116).  Thus, despite its ambiguity, governments around the world are 
beholden by their people to safeguard them from terrorism. Only making it more difficult, 
governments must find a way to do this despite terrorism’s lack of a singular and consolidated 
definition. 
As “new terrorism” becomes and increasingly prevalent and lethal issue, this paper 
argues that governments must evolve in their fight against it. They must stop treating the 
terrorism of the present the same as terrorism of the past. Unilateral proclamations of no 
negotiation and the seemingly prevailing attitude that terrorists are simply irrational political 
extremists are no longer satisfactory. Indeed, “the governments of many countries including 
Britain, Israel, and the United States, have frequently and openly declared they will never enter 
negotiations with terrorists” (Quackenbush 421). Because of terrorism’s modern lethality, 
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governments must be more willing to engage with, communicate with, and negotiate with 
terrorist groups. Governments must also “reject the argument of the news media that terrorists 
are characteristically madmen who cannot be bargained with” (Atkinson, Tschirhart, & Sandler 
3). These perceptions and proclamations, while often made with deterrence in mind, “lead people 
to make choices that in retrospect turn out to be bad” (Quackenbush 427). Additionally, through 
a positive side effect of increased engagement, governments will be better suited in their quest of 
locating and addressing the societal grievances which spawn these actors, thus destroying the 
extremism at its roots (Mohamedou, Goodarzi). As the communications officer for Geneva Call 
(an NGO which attempts to engage and negotiate with non-state actors) Christopher Fitzsimons 
argues: “Negotiation is a means to the end of protecting civilians. Violence and the status quo are 
not working.” 
Therefore, at its roots, this paper seeks to address how contemporary governments can 
approach the problem of “new terrorism.” First, it seeks to broadly define the term of terrorism in 
the context of the modern era, recognizing that terrorism and terrorist groups can differ highly in 
structure and practices. Through game theory and analysis, the paper will then go beyond the 
argument of what classifies a non-state actor as terroristic, rather arguing that the definitional 
ambiguity of the term is exactly why nations needs to retrofit their one-size-fits-all approach. 
While terrorist groups have several consistencies which can earn them such a classification, it is 
the differences which open them up to potential negotiation. The paper also seeks to answer if 
proclamations to terror groups, whether followed or not in actuality, deter or invite violence. It 
will also delve into the question of deterrence, and whether negotiation inspires additional groups 
to also seek concessions. Finally, it will take the concept of the bargaining model of war, 
typically reserved for conflict between a dyad of nation-states, and apply it to modern day 
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terrorist organizations. In conjunction, these questions will push the argument of how states can 
better approach modern terrorism – both through engaging with the violent actors themselves, 
but also through addressing and understanding the societal underpinnings which spur violence in 
the first place.  
 
Literature Review 
 The subjects of terrorism, negotiation, and national security have large bodies of 
literature surrounding them. And for good reason. Discussed more in the Context and Definitions 
section of this paper, scholars have been debating and studying these themes for decades, with no 
common conclusion emerging among them. Perspectives differ by eras, regions, ideologies, and 
more. This essay attempts to combine both theory and practical studies from a variety of 
experienced and respected scholars and political scientists from peer-reviewed sources.  
Several of these sources aid the paper in finding a common, working definition for 
terrorism. A few include Erica Chenoweth & Pauline Moore’s The Politics of Terror, and Bruce 
Hoffman’s The Origins of Contemporary Terrorism, Defining Terrorism, and Terrorism Today 
and Tomorrow. Others, including but not limited to Stephen Quackenbush’s Principles of 
International Politics, Harmonie Toros’s Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts, and 
Suzanne Werner and Darren Filson’s A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the 
Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War, help inform the paper’s general argument. Finally, 
several sources provide analytical, quantitative data in order to better support and characterize 
the paper’s hypothesis. These include: Bryan Brophy-Baermann & John Conybeare’s Retaliating 
against Terrorism: Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Rules versus Discretion; Scott 
Atkinson, Todd Sandler, and John Tschirhart’s Terrorism in a Bargaining Framework; and 
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Harvey E. Lapan & Todd Sandler’s To Bargain or Not To Bargain: That is The Question. 
Importantly, these sources, among several others not listed above, were not used exclusively for 
any one task or section. Rather, each connect and combine into the general overarching theme of 
the paper. Each source within the body of research informs the hypothesis and is critically 
important to the final argument.  
 
Research Methodology 
This research paper uses primary and secondary sources in the forms of personal interviews, 
academic journal articles, case studies, and academic studies.  
 Four personal interviews were conducted and included in this paper. The interviewees 
were selected strategically based on their experiences, expertise and backgrounds. Each of the 
four interviewees are experts in the field of international relations, with a diverse, yet relevant, 
breadth of experiences. These experts specialize in a variety of topics including but not limited to 
terrorism, negotiation tactics, non-state actors, and various global regions. The interviewees were 
initially approached via email. 
 A variety of scholarly articles and studies were used as sources for various aspects of the 
topic. Mostly drawn from the realm of terrorism and security policy, the various sources study 
and analyze the definition of terrorism, its global impact, the methods in which states respond, 
and more.  
This paper considers a variety of perspectives found within the academic sources and 
personal interviews. It attempts to accurately assess and credit the arguments of the authors and 
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interviewees. In regards to the personal interviews, all were presented with their rights as 
interviewees, as well as what they should expect of the interviewer. Each gave verbal consent to 
participate in the interview process. In each case, notes were taken throughout in order to assure 
accuracy. Zero ethical concerns arose throughout the interviews. Further, there were zero 
instances of the interviewee requesting to be off-the-record or requesting the retraction of certain 
statements.  
 
Context and Definitions 
As mentioned previously, the definition of terrorism is one that is hotly contested. 
However, as this research paper is not solely focused on identifying the most true definition of 
the term, if one even exists, it will instead enlist a fairly agreed upon working definition of the 
term. According to Bruce Hoffman, a political analyst who specializes in the study of terrorism 
and counterterrorism, and Harmonie Toros, Professor at the University of Wales in the 
Department of International Politics, the concept of terrorism has several consistencies 
throughout various groups and timeframes (Hoffman 35, Toros 409). First, a terrorist employs 
the “use of violence.” Second, a terrorist’s goal is “ineluctably political” (Hoffman 35-38). 
Third, a terrorist “affects a larger audience than its immediate target” in an effort to produce fear 
and intimidation (Toros 409). Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, in their Political Terrorism: A 
New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature, support such 
constants with data. They take 109 different definitions of terrorism from various dictionaries 
and organizations in an effort to find “frequencies of definitional elements.” Supporting Hoffman 
and Toros’s definition, Schmid and Jongman find that the element of “Violence, force” shows up 
in 83.5% of all definitions. “Political” shows up in 65% of all definitions. “Fear, terror” shows 
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up in 51% of all definitions (Schmid & Jongman). Thus, while it is all but impossible to reach a 
consensus on the singular definition of terrorism, for the purpose of my research paper I will use 
the three step definition laid out by Hoffman and Toros, and supported by Schmid and Jongman, 
in order to distinguish terrorist actors from other non-state actors. Condensed, terrorism can be 
understood as “a violent means aimed at triggering political change by affecting a larger 
audience than its immediate target” (Toros 410).  
Importantly, the working definition for the purposes of this paper will not include lone 
wolf actors nor state-sponsored terrorist entities. Understanding that terrorism has many different 
forms, Professor of International Affairs and expert in transnational terrorism Dr. Mohamed 
Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou argues that actual engagement is more realistic in the context of 
separate, independent terrorist groups. The professor asserts that lone wolf actors, for example, 
offer no context for negotiations. Without being part of an organized political group or 
movement, it is impossible to determine, as well as highly debated, whether it is appropriate to 
distinguish political terror from murder founded in personal animus (Mohamedou). Dr. 
Mohamedou argues that these instances are often handled by separate government entities and 
not classified as terrorism by the state (Mohamedou). State-sponsored terror groups, on the other 
hand, are also “not open to actual engagement” as their actions are dictated by that of a formal 
political entity (Mohamedou). Any subsequent negotiation or engagement, then, would be rather 
conducted with that of the formal entity as opposed to that of the sponsored terror group. Thus, 
while the essay understands that terrorism takes a variety of forms, the paper will, for the 








Perceptions and Rationality 
Terrorism of the present is evolving “rapidly and consequentially” as groups adapt to new 
technology, methods of warfare, and communication strategies. “Technology changes the 
equation,” argues Christopher Fitzsimons of Geneva Call. “Groups of the past were less 
organized, had less access to better weapons, and had overall less capacity than they have today. 
They’re much more sophisticated now” (Fitzsimons). “New terrorism” does not escape the 
definitional fate of high variation in those accused of practicing it. However, for those who do, it 
grants terrorist entities a pathway to impacting the political sphere unlike any they’ve had in the 
past. Suddenly, terrorism has become a viable, and sometimes rational, geopolitical strategy; one 
capable of thrusting groups and organizations onto the global radar with a historically unique 
ability to carry out their political goals and ideology internationally.  
New terrorism can be practiced by both rational and irrational groups. But what separates 
them? In the opinion of many scholars, it’s the ability for the terrorist groups to seek out realistic 
goals and to have the capacity to engage in real political negotiations. “We reject the argument of 
news media that terrorists are characteristically madmen who cannot be bargained with” 
(Atkinson, Sanders, & Tschirhart 3). “The madman depiction is a myth” argues University of 
California professor and author of The Politics of Terrorism Michael Stohl. “Many terrorist 
groups have particular goals that are sought as part of an ongoing political struggle. There are 
numerous instances in which careful negotiations regarding terrorist demands led to peaceful 
solutions” (Stohl). Stephen Quackenbush, in his Principles of International Politics, writes: 
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“Many people look at groups like Hamas or Al Qaeda and think that they and all 
terrorists are crazy, irrational fanatics with no sense of morality or decency. Because of 
this outlook, it is common for people to believe that governments should never negotiate 
with terrorists. Indeed, the governments of many countries, including Britain, Israel, and 
the United States, have frequently and openly declared that they will never enter into 
negotiations with terrorists. The belief that terrorists are unusual types of people with 
cruel and unbending inclinations is probably behind this response.” 
As argued by scholars, many terrorists exhibit the rational ability to negotiate and seek realistic 
goals. Looking further into the issue of rationality versus irrationality, Quackenbush identifies 
the discrepancy through his three reasons for conflict: Uncertainty, commitment problems, and 
indivisibility of issues (Quackenbush 440). The first two, uncertainty and commitment problems, 
he argues, are able to be rectified through new information via negotiation (Quackenbush 420). 
When it is these issues separating terrorist groups from a peaceful political solution, 
Quackenbush contends that the group is rational. He further coins the terrorist groups fitting this 
mold as “reluctant terrorists.” Quackenbush identifies the preferences of reluctant terrorists as: 
Negotiation > Terrorist attack > Repression. Indivisible issues, on the other hand, block irrational 
groups from a peaceful solution. In the field of new terrorism these indivisible issues often 
manifest themselves in the form of religion. These “intensely religious” groups, as Bruce 
Hoffman would call them, refuse to compromise due to their indivisible issue. Thus, they are 
classified as “True Believers.” True believers will commit the terrorist attack whether the 
government is open to negotiations or not because they will always have a uncompromising 
reason for conflict. The priorities of true believers are: Terrorist attack > Negotiation > 
Repression (Quackenbush 420).  
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 Whether the group is rational (a reluctant terrorist) or irrational (a true believer) is not 
always clear. With a wide variety of ideologies, practices, and ideals among various terrorist 
entities, governments can have an extremely difficult time determining which is which. Only to 
make matters more confusing, terrorist groups have a wide variety of ideologies, practices, and 
ideals within their own ranks (Mohamedou). There are “radicals among radicals with negotiators 
within,” but also “negotiators among negotiators with radicals within (Mohamedou). This, as 
argued by Jason Burke in his Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, makes terrorist 
organizations “dynamic and protean and profoundly difficult to characterize” (Burke 1). 
However, it is this very same “complexity and multiplicity,” as Toros puts it, that “offers more 
points of entry and contact.” Al-Qaeda is a perfect example of this. Despite most interpretations 
seeing the group as irrational non-negotiators, or true believers, there are several occasions in 
which they have inquired adversaries for peace in the past. Toros argues that “the complexity of 
Al Qaeda’s structure can be seen as an opening for the understanding of and an engagement with 
the network” (Toros 418). Despite its hard-faced ideology of pan-Islamism, advocated for by 
former leader Osama bin Laden, “it is conceivable to engage with these groups even though the 
central command or hard core of Al-Qaeda rejects any form of dialogue” (Toros 418). Despite 
Osama bin Laden’s 2004 declaration saying “there can be no dialogue with occupiers except 
through arms” (Toros 418), many locally based groups with links to Al-Qaeda have in fact 
engaged with governments nonviolently. Namely, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) has 
engaged in “on-and-off peace talks” with the Filipino government despite its “international 
Islamist ties” with Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden himself (Toros 418).  
 Thus, despite terrorism’s high rate of differentiation and variation, scholars have 
attempted to classify them not by their traits but by their preferences. By doing so, they can 
 
16 
better circumvent false or misleading perceptions. They can trust that groups with indivisible 
issues, no matter what that issue is, will not negotiate and instead prefer to attack, while other 
groups without issue indivisibility have the possibility of coming to a political solution through 
negotiation – if the government can eliminate uncertainty and commitment problems. 
 
The Paradox of Proclamations 
Understanding the perceptions, we realize that some terrorists have the capacity to 
operate rationally. However, we also understand that no two terrorist groups are the same – like 
the definitional ambiguity of the concept, groups who commit terrorism differentiate massively. 
Thus, it can be difficult for leaders to determine who exactly they are dealing with; negotiators or 
radicals. Even more complex, in any given group there is a combination of hardline true 
believers and potentially amenable reluctant terrorists (Mohamedou). Often, “as a consequence 
of this uncertainty, [governments] might choose an improper response” (Quackenbush 427). As 
Quackenbush argues, countries, in response to lack of information, frequently lump these groups 
together when dictating response policy. “One common response to terrorism is to take a tough 
stance. . . The posture of non-negotiation is the declared policy of the United States and many 
other governments (Quackenbush 423). Harvey E. Lapan and Todd Sandler, in their To Bargain 
or Not To Bargain: That is The Question, concur. Applying game theory to terrorist 
organization’s behavior, Lapan and Sandler argue: “Accepted wisdom, heard almost daily in 
news-casts, maintains that one should never bargain with terrorists since such negotiations 
encourage more hostage taking by making it a profitable activity” (Lapan & Sandler 16). Thus, 
countries commonly respond to terrorism with a proclamation of non-negotiation – the classic 
“we do not negotiate with terrorists.” However, when put into practice, “the conventional 
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wisdom regarding the no-negotiation strategy does not withstand theoretical scrutiny except in a 
limited number of contrived cases” (Lapan & Sandler 16). Despite the intention of signaling to 
terrorists that the government “means business,” the adoption of declaratory policies, or 
proclamations, often produce an “unanticipated and undesired negative consequence for the 
government” (Quackenbush 420).  
Proclamations, although “intended to deter terrorist threats,” may actually “increase the 
risk of terrorist attacks” (Quackenbush 421). And there is a simple reason for this. By declaring a 
firm policy stance against negotiation, countries are effectively pooling all terrorists, even those 
which may prefer negotiation, into a single group. In game theory terms, this would be a pooling 
equilibrium. Reluctant terrorists, with a lack of access to the negotiation table (whether real or 
perceived depending on the government’s enforcement of the proclamation), may instead turn to 
violence as opposed to being content with the status quo (Quackenbush). As Harmonie Toros, in 
her Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts, puts it: “Indeed, it seems that more often 
than not all the cards in the deck are being called spades. There is no doubt there are spades 
there, but by recognizing only spades, participants are left with only spades to play with” (Toros 
422). By pooling these terrorists through proclamation, states are limiting their responses to only 
that of how to handle “spades,” or true believers. Paradoxically, “being open to negotiations is 
the very thing that would help [governments] distinguish between true believers and reluctant 
terrorists” (Quackenbush 427). By not declaring a proclamation of non-negotiation, governments 
are in practice “separating the behavior of true believers from reluctant terrorists” along lines of 
willingness to negotiate – a separating equilibrium (Quackenbush 427). The radical true 
believers will act as they had before, but “the behavior of the reluctant terrorists will change” 
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(Quackenbush 427). Groups preferring political negotiation with the government will have that 
option and choose it over committing violence. 
In a study done by Lapan and Sandler in their To Bargain or Not To Bargain: That is the 
Question, the notion of whether a “government would want to precommit itself to a no-
negotiation strategy” is tested through an “economic analysis in a simple game-theory 
framework” (Lapan & Sandler, 16). There are just two players in this game: The government and 
terrorists, with a hostage situation being the 
game’s setting. Their conclusion is that the 
“beliefs and the resolve of the terrorists are 
crucial in identifying the rather restrictive 
scenarios in which a no-negotiation strategy is 
desirable in the case of a credible 
precommitment” (Lapan & Sandler, 16). In 
other words, depending on if a terrorist falls 
into the “true believer” category, (prioritizing 
the act of terror over negotiation over the status 
quo) or the “reluctant terrorist” category 
(prioritizing negotiation over the act of terror 
over the status quo), the government will want 
to modify its response. However, as seen in the 
game, the government cannot know if the 
terrorist player will choose to attack or not 
attack (negotiate) before it must make this 
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precommitment of choosing a deterrence expenditure. Thus, based on logical predictions, they 
must make this decision beforehand. As shown in the figure, the ideal scenario for the 
government (assuming any subsequent terror attack does not result in logistical failure) is to 
choose the deterrence expenditure of negotiation and have the terrorists in turn choose “no 
attack,” or agreeing to negotiate. This would happen if the terrorist group was reluctant terrorists. 
If the group was true believers, however, the terrorist player would choose to attack despite the 
government choosing negotiation. Importantly, true believers would make this same decision no 
matter the government deterrence choice. They “will attack regardless of a credible 
precommitment strategy” (Lapan & Sandler, 18). The difference would land with the reluctant 
terrorists. If a precommit strategy was such that negotiations cannot occur, for example a 
credible proclamation, the probability of the reluctant terrorists choosing to attack is far higher. 
“When precommitment does not eliminate all attacks, precommitment would imply higher ex 
post costs from inflexibility in those incidents where costs would be minimized by [negotiating]” 
(Lapan & Sandler, 19). Because of this change in reluctant terrorist behavior, the actual returns 
of a non-negotiation strategy is a higher probability of attack. Thus, as argued by Harmonie 
Toros, “negotiations in terrorist conflicts are not only possible, they are potentially less 
destructive than most other responses to terrorism envisioned by academics and policy-makers-
today” (Toros 423).  
 As shown through game theory, governments must be weary of proclamations of non-
negotiation. The common practice promulgated by uncertainty, and often done in the name of 
deterrence, in fact causes more harm than good. Effectively pooling the so-called reluctant 
terrorists (possible negotiators) and true believers (irrational radicals), proclamations alienate 
groups interested in negotiation and thus diminish any opportunity for peaceful resolution. 
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Indeed, proclamations may push some of these reluctant terrorists to commit violent acts, as 
opposed to maintaining the status quo, believing they have no other choice. By not signaling 
intentions via proclamations, governments can better focus their efforts on “fighting the true 
believers and looking for sensible compromises with others” (Quackenbush 427). 
 
Terrorism on the Bargaining Model of War 
 Keeping both proclamations and perceptions in mind, we can now look into the question 
of whether a government should or should not engage in negotiations with every rational 
“reluctant terrorist” group. Game theory suggests that negotiation is possible with rational actors, 
but does not paint the entire picture. Even when negotiation is an option, sometimes governments 
would be better off repressing or fighting terrorist groups instead of giving into negotiation 
demands. In order to determine whether this is so, the negotiation process should instead be 
brought to the bargaining model of war in order to examine whether it suits the government’s 
interests. 
 Typically, the bargaining model of war is used to compare a dyad of nation-states. 
However, according to a study done by Scott Atkinson, Todd Sandler, and John Tschirhart, 
terrorist groups as well respond to changes in the situation in real time through their perceived 
costs and benefits (Atkinson, Sandler & Tschirhart). Their study, which examines forty-two 
incidents where terrorist groups have demanded ransom for hostages, accounts for a wide variety 
of situational variables and measures their impact on the eventual outcome. As seen in “Table 1” 
on page 21, different variables (under the center definition column) lead to different probabilities 
of end result (Atkinson, Sandler, & Tschirhart). In cases where a hostage is wounded, for 
example, the outcome is 9.512 standard deviations away from that of the average ransom 
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situation outcome. In table 2 (page 22), then, looking at the independent variable of NUMHOSW 
(number of hostages wounded), it is shown in each of the three models that this will negatively 
impact the terrorist groups ability to obtain demanded random (-24.837; -23.292; -22.787). In 
other words, the probability for a terrorist group to receive average ransom in a situation with a 
wounded hostage is much lower than that of the probability for a terrorist group to receive 
average ransom in the average situation (Atkinson, Sandler & Tschirhart). The variables, 
therefore, have measured impact, representing themselves in “either increases or decreases in 
bargaining costs to either party” (Atkinson, Sandler & Tschirhart). Thus, with the data presented 
in Atkinson, Sandler, and Tschirhart’s study, we can reasonably analyze “terrorist negotiations in 
a bargaining framework” as the groups, much like nation-states, are conscious of and impacted 
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In their A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and 
Outcome of War, Suzanne Werner and Darren Filson explain that in the model, each player has 
certain costs and certain benefits. “Each player’s objective is to obtain as many benefits as 
possible” (Filson & Werner 821). They do this through the negotiation process, where both sides 
(the government versus the terrorist organization) have the option to negotiate peace or go to 
“war.” Both sides would analyze their perceived costs and perceived benefits in relation to one 
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another. For the government, the perceived costs may be the risk of several citizens being killed 
in a terror attack. The perceived benefits may be successfully repressing the terror organization. 
For the terrorists, the perceived costs and benefits would be flipped. In the center of the model is 
the bargaining range. This is the area between both sides perceived costs of war. Based on the 
perceived costs and benefits, the two sides would negotiate and, in the case of terrorist entities, 
the terrorist group would offer its demands. If the demands fell into the bargaining range, the 
government would accept. If they went beyond that of the bargaining range (past what the 
government determines its perceived costs of going to war may be) the government would refuse 
to negotiate, believing instead that giving into the demands would be more costly than the terror 
attack itself. 
The bargaining model of war is important for governments to apply during terrorist 
engagements because the costs and benefits of negotiation versus attack are not constant figures. 
Terrorist groups, especially in the era of new terrorism, are highly varied in practices and 
objectives. Despite maintaining the assumption that they reluctant terrorists, these entities are 
constantly shifting and evolving. Thus, the bargaining model, with its ability for costs and 
benefits to shift given new information, suits the highly ambiguous situation of dealing with a 
terrorist entity. With this model, governments can analyze groups on a case-by-case basis, 
coming to different conclusions given different situations.   
 
Does Negotiation Compromise Deterrence? 
 We can see that negotiation is a viable and positive path for governments to pursue in 
some situations. However, many governments continue to declare policies of unequivocal non-
negotiation anyways. Why? The answer, of course, is deterrence. Many policy-makers argue that 
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dropping proclamations and instead engaging in negotiation may “encourage more groups of 
people to pretend to be terrorists (of the reluctant type) so that they can extract concessions from 
the government” (Quackenbush 424). The argument seems logical – give out concessions to 
violent groups and more groups will come knocking. However, a hard look at the realities of the 
bargaining model of war and an examination of the data compiled in Bryan Brophy-Baermann 
and John Conybeare’s study of the effects of past deterrence suggest otherwise.  
 In their study Retaliating against Terrorism: Rational Expectations and the Optimality of 
Rules versus Discretion, Bryan Brophy-Baermann and John Conybeare enlist a “time series 
intervention model of terrorist attacks against Israel” in order to show that retaliation has “no 
long-term deterrent or escalation effect.” The model studies the frequency of terrorist attacks 
against Israel over a period of time, examining if strong retaliation events conducted by the 
Jewish state (for example: airstrikes), have any effect on future attack rates. Brophy-Baermann 
and Conybeare find that reprisal attacks have an extremely small and temporary deterrence 
value. As seen in their graph, Israeli retaliations (shown by the dates and arrows), do not have a 
large impact on the rate of 
future attacks. In fact, by 
dividing the data set into 
four, Brophy-Baermann and 
Conybeare found an 
average rate of 2.13 attacks 
per quarter. Despite some 
quarters having more 
reprisal attacks than others, 
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none of the quarters were statistically significant in their deviation from that average terrorist 
attack rate (Brophy-Baermann & Conybeare). “Although such tough declarations may win 
votes,” they argue, “there is significant evidence that retaliation against terrorists has no long-
term deterrent effect” (Brophy-Baermann & Conybeare). In fact, when looking at isolated 
instances, the study finds that the only events which cause the deterrence value to “deviate from 
the natural rate” are unexpected ones (Brophy-Baermann & Conybeare). This means that if 
terrorists do not expect the response they receive from the Israeli government (whether high 
retaliation or low), it will cause longer lasting deterrence rates. In conclusion, Brophy-Baermann 
and Conybeare’s study on retaliation against terrorism signifies that both strong and expected 
deterrence are “largely irrelevant in the long term.” Perhaps intuitively backwards, governments 
are actually better suited not revealing their intentions through proclamations and instead 
considering negotiation as a more impactful alternative.  
 Further disproving the idea that present negotiation may lead to more requests of 
concessions in the future, the bargaining model of war shows that newcomers often would not 
have their demands met by governments anyways. Through the rules of the bargaining model of 
war, we know that each player on the bargaining model has the objective to “obtain as many 
benefits as possible while conserving resources” (Filson & Werner 821). Assuming this to be 
true, existing powerful terrorist groups would have leverage with the government, thus 
prompting the government to offer concessions of negotiation. The government would perceive 
the the cost of going to war with these powerful groups as more costly than granting the 
concessions. Quackenbush, however, argues that newcomer organizations “just about always 
start out as very small, weak collections of disaffected people with little influence” 
(Quackenbush 420). These weaker groups, therefore, would find themselves in a different 
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situation entirely. If the government feels as though it will obtain more benefits and conserve 
more resources through the dismissal or repression of the weaker specified terrorist organization, 
it will do so instead of partaking in negotiations. Even with the option of negotiation available 
and pursued by the terrorist organization, the government might see more potential benefits 
through removing the group all together. And, as we know from Atkinson, Sandler, and 
Tschirhart’s study, the “terrorists” are not ignorant to this reality. Thus, not many will wish to 
engage “in that extremely risky bluff” unless they can somehow reach the status of a powerful 
terrorist organization without being repressed first. (Quackenbush 424). In conclusion, “it is 
unlikely many groups will pretend to be terrorists when doing so might get them some 
concessions but also might get them killed” (Quackenbush 424). 
 Therefore, the deterrence argument simply does not hold up. Through Brophy-Baermann 
and Conybeare’s analysis on Israeli hard retaliation strategies, it is shown that hard retaliation 
has no worthwhile deterrence effect. In fact, only unexpected government responses are able to 
modify the deterrence value. Through Atkinson, Sandler, and Tschirhart’s study on terrorism and 
bargaining, it is shown that rational terrorists are aware and influenced by their probability of 
success. Weak rational newcomers will not be inspired by past negotiations to threaten future 
terror, understanding the potential implications of doing so. Governments therefore should keep 
the pathway of negotiation open, relegating whether it is indeed the desirable option on a case-




 In conclusion, nations in the modern world must alter their strategy on terrorism in light 
of its increasing prevalence and lethality. Due in part to the massive differentiation between one 
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terrorist group to another, nations must rid themselves of proclamations of no negotiation. As 
shown by Lapan and Sandler, proclamation can actually lead to higher rates of violence as 
opposed to deterring it. Governments should also apply terrorist groups on a case-by-case basis 
to the bargaining line. The irrational true believers will continue to commit terror and be guided 
by the same behavior as they would have previously. However, through the bargaining line, the 
government can assess whether negotiation, dismissal, or repression is the best path in any given 
situation involving a reluctant terrorist group. If the government deems the cost of the potential 
terror attack to be greater than that of giving concessions, it will choose to negotiate. If it deems 
the costs of the potential terror attack to be lower than that of giving concessions, it will not. 
Finally, governments should not refuse to negotiate out of fear of losing credible deterrence. 
Through the study done by Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare, governments can see that hard, 
predictable retaliation has very little to no deterrence value. If the government wishes to increase 
its deterrence it should, perhaps counterintuitively, open up the possibility of negotiation as 
opposed to threatening retaliation. 
 If these steps towards more flexible engagement policies are taken, governments will 
experience the additional side effect of an increased understanding of their terrorist adversaries. 
According to Dr. Jubin Goodarzi, increased levels of engagement with the violent actors 
themselves will allow governments to “better understand the societal underpinnings which spur 
violence in the first place” (Goodarzi). Further, we know through the bargaining model of war 
that the level of uncertainty is lowered as new information is revealed (Filson & Werner). Thus, 
governments with more flexible engagement policies may have the opportunity while negotiating 
to see the underlying problems which the drove the group to make such demands in the first 
place. Sometimes these problems are indivisible and the government has no possibility of 
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correcting them. However, through “opening the doors to negotiation, whether it works with 
every group or not, the government has the opportunity (and the increased level of information) 
to make that call” (Goodarzi). If done correctly, governments will gain the capacity to stop 
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